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In complex situations where there is an unclear link between the available options and an 
advantageous outcome, visceral signals of arousal play a role in decision-making. Perception of the 
body’s various visceral signals is called interoceptive awareness (IA). Exposure to stressful events 
can impede the production and perception of these signals, leading to a potentially impaired 
perception of risk and impeded decision-making. However, there is a paucity of research exploring 
the impact of life event stress on IA, or how both of these factors may influence the dynamic 
process of decision-making during risk. To address this gap the current study investigated how life 
event stress may impact the assessment of risk in decision-making by impairing the perception of 
visceral signals of arousal. A community sample of 86 subjects were recruited and given the Life 
Experiences Survey (LES) to assess stress from life events, the Mental Tracking Method (MTM) to 
determine IA, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess decision-making in situations involving risk, 
and skin conductance levels (SCL) measured prior to each trial of the IGT as a visceral signal of 
arousal. Results indicated that IA was negatively correlated with avoidance of risk on the IGT. 
Breaking the 100 trials IGT into 5 blocks of 20, regression analyses showed that different factors of 
interest each predicted safe choosing at different times. Less life event stress, as indicated by higher 
LES scores, predicted more safe choosing for the first block of trials. Increased IA scores predicted 
less safe choosing on the second and third blocks. Elevated SCL prior to risky choices compared to 
safe choices predicted safe choosing for blocks 3, 4, and 5. Findings suggest a temporally dynamic 
process of factors influencing risk assessment. Results also highlight the limitations of the MTM as 
an indicator of interoception. Future research points toward more holistic measures for both IA and 
life event stress to better understand their dynamic influence on decision-making during risk.  
Keywords: interoception, interoceptive awareness, life event stress, autonomic arousal, decision-making, risk. 
  






 Something is not quite right, but you can’t put your finger on it. You’re not sure why, but 
something feels off. You make a decision without consciously weighing the pros and cons, reacting 
to a feeling you haven’t yet put into words. Sensitivity to these physical indicators of emotion is 
called interoceptive awareness (IA; Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007). Though these signals are 
rarely consciously noted, merely framing our affective state, they guide many of our choices, 
interpretations, and thus our actions. This impact is even greater when the circumstances are risky 
and unclear, during these situations physical states, or “gut feelings,” play a stronger role in 
determining behavior. As such, improving IA might improve decision-making in risky situations. 
Since stress can often impede our ability to notice bodily sensations, stress may negatively impact 
decision-making in risky situations specifically by impeding IA. Modeling the relationship between 
stress, IA, and decision-making during risk is a critical step in understanding how stress can put 
people at increased risk for further negative outcomes by impairing their assessment of risk. 
During complex situations where there is an unclear link between the available options and 
an advantageous outcome, visceral signals of arousal can play a role in decision-making. Internal 
signals of arousal have been shown to help people to learn to avoid making risky, disadvantageous 
choices in favor of safer, advantageous ones (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). The 
extent to which one is aware of their somatic cues of arousal, IA, could then moderate one’s ability 
to learn to avoid risky, disadvantageous, choices. Stress has been shown to have a strong impact on 
IA (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Current models of interoception and risk assessment have not taken 
into account the impact of certain types of stress. Elucidating this relationship could lead to a better 
understanding of how emotions in general guide behavior, when stress keeps them from doing so, 
and how different types of stress can impede learning to avoid risky situations.  
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In this paper pertinent theoretical and empirical knowledge is reviewed, beginning with the 
evolution of theories of emotion and how they are intertwined with physiological states. Autonomic 
arousal, the body’s reaction to internal or external emotionally arousing stimuli, is discussed along 
with methods by which it is collected. The accurate perception of one’s physical state, IA, and how 
this typically implicit process can be measured is discussed. Disruptions of interoception common to 
various psychopathologies are detailed. Physiological responses to risk are considered, followed by 
research on how these responses inform learning that is done outside of conscious awareness called 
Implicit Learning. Stress, along with how the physical responses to stress may influence the 
assessment or risk, is also considered.  
Theories of Emotion 
The subjective experience of emotion has long been understood to be intrinsically tied to 
one’s physiological state (Barrett, 2017; Damasio, 1994; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Scherer, 2005). 
Contemporary theories of emotion, starting with William James, have cited physiological arousal and 
its recognition as necessary parts of the emotional process (James, 1884). James’ theory posited that 
the body reacted to stimuli and it was the recognition of this physiological reaction which was the 
emotion (Ellsworth, 1994; James, 1884). James’ theory is often over-simplified as stating that 
emotions are the perception of bodily changes that occur in response to a stimulus; however, James 
later clarified that the perception of bodily changes in response to stimuli is a necessary component 
of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994). 
James’ emphasis on emotion as the labelling of an affective state was later elaborated upon in 
the Two-Factor theory of Emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962). According to this theory emotion is 
comprised of two factors, physiological arousal and a cognitive label. When physiological arousal is 
noticed, a reason for this arousal is ascribed based on the current situation, and based on this a 
cognitive label ascribed. These two together form the emotion. Arousal, within this theory, is 
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uniform and one dimensional; it could be low or high but the authors stated that there was no 
difference between the types of arousal elicited by different emotional states (Schachter & Singer, 
1962). They concluded, and supported with research, that arousal is felt, and then a reason for this 
arousal searched for. In their experiments subjects were injected with epinephrine or a placebo, and 
then either induced by the behaviors of a confederate to ascribe their physical state to anger, 
euphoria, or given no such emotional behavior modeling (Schachter & Singer, 1962). From their 
experiments, they deduced that if a cause for physiological arousal is found, the cognitive label of an 
emotion is applied and the emotion experienced. If no cause for the physiological state is ascribed, 
because the state was not noticed or no reason for emotional activation found, the subject would 
neither report nor exhibit any emotional arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962). This view of arousal as 
being undifferentiated among emotions was later challenged by studies that induced different 
emotions and recorded distinct patterns of physiological arousal, such as the unconscious activation 
of different facial muscles (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), changes in heart rate and skin 
conductance (Kreibig, 2010), or self-reports of somatic regions that felt differentially activated or de-
activated (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & Hietanen, 2014). While the cognitive interpretation of 
arousal remains important, subsequent research has shown that rather than cognition determining 
the interpretation and effect of arousal, somatic cues of arousal may guide cognition, even without 
conscious awareness it is doing so (Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996). 
According to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis different marker signals, somatic cues such as 
soreness or rapid heart rate, play a dominant role in the perception of emotion (Damasio, 1994). 
Somatic information can influence these cognitions either covertly, outside of conscious awareness, 
or overtly, within conscious awareness, by biasing decision-making or the interpretation of stimuli 
(Damasio et al., 1996). The mental representation of the somatic self, based on afferent somatic 
feedback, is seen as an essential part of the emotional process and the primary pathway through 
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which emotion is perceived both overtly and covertly. Emotion is proposed to guide behavior 
through the subjective experience of physiological arousal. Research using subjects with damage to 
sections of their brains have shown that the reduction in physiological arousal is also coupled with 
reductions in affect and difficulties in decision-making (Bechara, 2004; Bechara & Martin, 2004; 
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2002; Wiens, 2005) The Somatic Marker Hypothesis is a widely utilized 
theory of emotion currently, as it has the advantage of defining what is otherwise an internal 
subjective experience as inseparable from observable physiological changes, such as changes in heart 
rate or skin conductance, that can be recorded and measured quantitatively (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Damasio et al., 1996; Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008).  
Given the aforementioned complex interaction between arousal and cognition, compounded 
by the misleading lay definitions of what an emotion is, Scherer (2005) sought to clarify the 
definition of an emotion with the Component Process theory of Emotion. This theory defined an 
emotion as a brief episode of interrelated, synchronized changes across several subsystems in 
response to the appraisal of a stimulus, internal or external, as it related to the concerns of the 
observer (Scherer, 2005). A central aspect of this theory is emotions are appraisal driven, and that 
the relevant stimulus and its consequences must be relevant to concerns of the observer. In this 
view emotions serve as relevance detectors, evaluating stimuli implicitly and guiding behavior by 
adjusting arousal and affect (Scherer, 2005). Emotion, according to this theory, can be broken into 
five components: cognitive appraisal, bodily symptoms, motivational aspects, motor expression, and 
the subjective feeling. The motivational component is the aspect of emotion that prepares and 
directs action in a certain direction, which could be said to be the evolutionarily most important 
aspect of emotion. Motor expressions include the communication of reactions and behavioral 
intentions, arguably a mix of the already considered motivational components and physiological 
reactions. Subjective feeling states, which are most commonly what folk definitions of emotion tend 
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to describe, are distinguished as a separable part of the emotion process but are not emotions in and 
of themselves. Interestingly, in this theory love is defined as a stable interpersonal attitude with 
strong positive feeling state, and not an emotion since it does not carry a specific cognitive 
component and is sustained over long periods, whereas emotions are of short duration (Scherer, 
2005). Like the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) this theory sees emotion as 
indistinguishable from physiological changes, and functions primarily as a guide for behavior 
(Scherer, 2005). It expands on the previous theory by incorporating the motivational component as 
a defining aspect and drawing greater focus on the role of appraisal as the instigator and determinant 
of subsequent emotional experiences (Scherer, 2005).  
Recently the nature of emotion as a reaction to a stimulus was challenged by the Theory of 
Constructed Emotion (Barrett, 2017). Barrett challenges some notions that are at the basis of 
emotion theory. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis posits that each emotion is attributable to a 
specific combination of somatic signs of arousal, and that these physiological changes are a reaction 
to a perceived stimulus (Damasio, 1994). The Component Process Theory proposes that an implicit 
appraisal of stimuli produce a cascade of changes, both cognitive and physiological, intended to 
guide and prepare for a reaction to the stimulus (Scherer, 2005). Both of these see emotion as a 
reaction that implicitly guides behavior in response to a specific stimulus (Damasio, 1994, Scherer, 
2005). These build on the findings of Reber (1989), who coined the term “implicit learning” to 
describe how the mind creates an internal representation of the environment that is used to solve 
problems and make accurate predictions independent of any conscious efforts or understanding. 
Based on observations from a meta-analysis of neuro-imaging research, the Theory of Constructed 
Emotion posits that the mind is constantly recognizing patterns and making predictions of the 
various outcomes that may result from the current experience based on previous experiences, and 
that these predictions are experienced in the body as the physical signs of affect (Barrett, 2017). 
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Emotion then becomes not purely a reaction to discreet perceived stimuli but the result of a 
constant sequence of pattern recognition guiding decision-making towards what is biologically 
advantageous (Barrett, 2017). Barrett’s theory supports previous research that has shown that 
subjects who experience reduced or no autonomic arousal, due to brain lesions or psychopathology, 
show difficulty not just making decisions but specifically predictive decisions in situations of 
uncertainty, in both laboratory or real-world settings (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000; 
Furman, Waugh, Bhattacharjee, Thompson, & Gotlib, 2013; Miu et al., 2008).  
A common thread to each of these theories is that the subjective experience of emotion 
serves the purpose of identifying emotionally salient situations and preparing the organism for an 
advantageous response. When the appropriate response includes a heightened level of physical 
activity the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system is activated in a process called 
autonomic arousal.  
Autonomic Arousal 
Autonomic arousal is the reflexive and unconscious activation of the sympathetic nervous 
system in response to an internal or external motivating stimulus (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 
2007). Activation of the sympathetic nervous system prepares the body for activity, accelerating 
heart rate and slowing digestion, whereas activation of the parasympathetic nervous system prepares 
the body to rest and digest. Activation of the autonomic nervous system has been shown to be 
differentiated, comprised of different combinations of activation depending on the emotion(s) 
elicited by the stimulus (Ekman et al., 1983; Nummenmaa et al., 2014). Since autonomic arousal is 
outside of conscious control and reactive to emotionally salient stimuli, it is often used in studies of 
emotion as a proxy for different aspects of emotional arousal.  
Skin conductance is a reliable and widely used measure of autonomic arousal (Dawson, 
Schell, & Filion, 2007). In this measure, a passive current is applied to the skin, usually on the palm 
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of the non-dominant hand, and when stimuli are presented that increase arousal, the amount of 
eccrine sweat in the dermal layer increases, reducing electrical resistance and increasing the amount 
of current passing through the skin (Cacioppo et al., 2007). This brief elevation in conductance is 
called a skin conductance response (SCR). Arousal as measured by SCR reflects only the level of 
autonomic activation, with no differentiation for the emotional valence of the stimulus (Cacioppo et 
al., 2007). Larger and more prolonged electrodermal responses have been associated with heightened 
emotional reactivity (Norris, Larsen, & Cacioppo, 2007).  
Cardiac activity is a useful physiological proxy for emotional affect as it is easy to measure 
and highly responsive to input from both the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems 
(Cacioppo et al., 2007; Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). Heart rate is typically 
measured via electrocardiogram (ECG), with sensors placed on the chest that record the electrical 
activity from activation of the heart (Cacioppo et al., 2007). When a novel stimulus is presented 
there is an initial deceleration of heart rate lasting one to two seconds, which is considered an 
orienting response and driven by activation of the parasympathetic nervous system, followed by 
heart rate acceleration, a preparation for action that is driven by activation of the sympathetic 
nervous system (Bradley, 2009; Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007). Short-term 
sympathetic activation from heightened emotional arousal can be measured as increases in the 
average beats per minute (BPM; Halligan, Michael, Wilhelm, Clark, & Ehlers, 2006) or increases in 
volumetric cardiac output (CO; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012). Heart rate varies naturally, 
increasing during inhalation to maximize absorption of oxygen, and decreasing during exhalation to 
conserve energy (Cacioppo et al., 2007). Due to a shared dependence on activation of the vagus 
nerve, heart rate variability is a reliable measure of the capacity for the parasympathetic nervous 
system to reduce autonomic arousal (Thayer et al., 2012). In particular this measure has been useful 
in determining if cardiac hyper-arousal symptoms are the product of hyper-activation of the 
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sympathetic nervous system or an under-activation of the parasympathetic nervous system 
(Cacioppo et al., 2007; Thayer et al., 2012). Heart rate variability has been shown to be reduced in 
populations whose symptoms include chronic hyper-arousal, including Panic Disorder (PD), 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), indicating that 
these symptoms may be driven not just by a higher sympathetic reactivity but also by a dysfunction 
of the parasympathetic nervous system’s ability to reduce emotional arousal (Chalmers, Quintana, 
Maree, Abbott, & Kemp, 2014; Cohen, Benjamin, Geva, Matar, Kaplan, & Kotler, 2000; Halligan et 
al., 2006; Pittig, Arch, Lam, & Craske, 2013; Tan, Dao, Farmer, Sutherland, & Gevirtz, 2011). 
Autonomic physiological changes have been shown to be effective proxies for the 
measurement of the subjective experiences of emotional arousal. However, while different patterns 
of physiological arousal have been shown to correspond to different emotive states (Ekman et al., 
1983; Kreibig, 2010), these measures are limited by capturing only levels of arousal, i.e. sympathetic 
versus parasympathetic input, and omit other factors intrinsic to emotion such as the valence, degree 
of positivity or negativity, or the subjective feeling component (Scherer, 2005). Though limited, 
measures of physiological arousal make it possible to quantify and measure differences in subjective 
physical experience in response to emotional stimuli (Dawson et al., 2007; Norris et al., 2007; Pittig 
et al., 2013; Tan et al., 2011), further reinforcing the association between physical state and 
emotional experience (Damasio, 1994; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Scherer, 2005). 
Interoceptive Awareness 
Given the important role bodily signals play in various theories of emotion, sensitivity to 
these signals is vital for the recognition and regulation of emotion (Damasio, 1994; Gross, 2013; 
Wiens, 2005). The awareness and integration of afferent somatic information is called IA (Calì, 
Ambrosini, Picconi, Mehling, & Committeri, 2015; Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Pollatos, Traut-
Mattausch, Schroeder, Schandry, 2007). Researchers have clarified this definition to include both 
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explicit awareness, when signs of emotion such as sweaty palms or increased heart rate come into 
conscious awareness, and implicit awareness, how signs from the body constantly inform a general 
state of being without the individual signals coming into conscious awareness (Calì et al., 2015). 
Explicit awareness of the somatic signals of emotion can inform the interpretation of one’s self and 
circumstances, and thus subsequent thoughts and behaviors (Gross, 2013; Schachter & Singer, 
1962). Implicit perception of the bodily signals of emotion, even though outside of conscious 
awareness, have been shown to guide behavior, particularly in situations where outcomes are unclear 
(Bechara, 2004; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). IA is thought to include, but is 
distinguishable from, two separate abilities. The ability to accurately perceive or distinguish somatic 
information when intentionally trying to do so is called interoceptive accuracy, while the likelihood 
of consciously thinking about somatic information called interoceptive sensibility (Garfinkel, Seth, 
Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015). Though related these concepts are still independent. Because one 
might be able to accurately distinguish somatic cues when consciously trying to do so, this does not 
necessarily mean that somatic information will be noticed or utilized when one is not consciously 
prompted to do so. Similarly, a greater likelihood of noticing somatic information does not mean 
that it will be interpreted accurately.  
While it has been suggested that IA is a mostly static trait (Stevens, Gerlach, Cludius, Silkens, 
Craske, & Hermann, 2011), other studies have shown that IA can be increased with self-oriented 
attention (Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013; Ainley, Tajadura-Jiménez, 
Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris, 2012). These contrasting findings could imply that current measurements of 
IA lack reliability (Ferentzi, Drew, Tihanyi, & Koteles, 2018) or require greater control for 
confounding variables (Murphy Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). Or, if IA is malleable, this 
could imply that targeted interventions could improve the sensitivity to and use of interoceptive 
information, which could then have an effect on certain psychopathologies (Dunn, Dalgleish, 
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Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Furman et al., 2013) or decision-making during 
risk (Dunn Galton, Morgan, Evans, Oliver, Meyer, Cusack, Lawrence, Dalgleish, 2010; Werner, 
Jung, Duschek, & Schandry, 2009). 
Most research in IA has been complicated by the paradox of using explicit knowledge of one 
physiological system to measure what in vivo is often an implicit process involving feedback from 
multiple physiological systems. IA is most commonly measured using the Mental Tracking Method 
(MTM; Schandry, 1981; Schulz & Vögele, 2015). During this task subjects are asked to count their 
heartbeats during a series of short time intervals without taking their pulse, and their reported 
number of heart beats is compared to their actual number of heart beats to create a score that 
reflects the subject’s accuracy (Schandry, 1981). Another similar method called the Heartbeat 
Discrimination Task (HDT) has the subject determine whether an audio cue is or is not 
synchronized with their heartbeat, with differences typically being between 200 and 350 milliseconds 
for unsynchronized trials (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & 
Blackwell, 1977). Schandry’s MTM is used more often to measure IA for two reasons: first it is an 
easier task to administer, and second asking subjects to discern if an audio cue and their heart beat 
are happening in tandem divides the subject’s attention and this becomes a potential confound 
(Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Both the MTM and HDT are technically measures of interoceptive 
accuracy but are used as proxies for IA. However, interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility, 
and IA have been shown in at least one study to be related only among those with high interoceptive 
accuracy (Garfinkel et al., 2015). This implies that interoceptive accuracy may not always correlate 
with overall IA. Also, the MTM and HDT measure sensitivity to cardiac information specifically, 
and IA is considered to encompass feedback from many physiological channels (Pollatos, Gramann 
et al., 2007). Some research has questioned the generalizability of cardiac sensitivity to sensitivity to 
other somatic indicators of emotion (Ceunen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2012), but most research on IA 
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accepts sensitivity to cardiac feedback as an effective indicator of the awareness of other somatic 
markers (Herbert et al., 2011; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007; Schulz & Vögele, 2015; Whitehead & 
Drescher, 1980). While both the MTM and HDT measure cardiac sensitivity when a subject has 
been explicitly instructed to attend to their heart beats, other measurable physiological changes can 
influence behavior while remaining entirely outside conscious awareness (Damasio, Everitt, & 
Bishop, 1996). Researchers have raised several valid questions regarding the construct validity of the 
MTM. Studies have shown scores on the MTM do not always correlate with other tests of cardiac 
sensitivity (Whitehead et al., 1977), and that repeated administrations of the MTM have low test-
retest reliability (Ferentzi et al., 2018). Several possible confounds have been shown to influence 
scores on the MTM but are rarely controlled for, such as regular exercise (Herbert et al., 2007), a 
priori knowledge of one’s resting heart rate (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Damasio, Davidson, Lutz, & Tranel, 
2008) and attentional resources (Murphy et al., 2018). Despite these drawbacks, the MTM is still the 
most commonly used behavioral measure to determine IA (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). 
IA can also be assessed through a self-report questionnaire. The Multidimensional 
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) is a 32 item self-report questionnaire designed to 
assess eight concepts that contribute to IA; such as emotional awareness “I notice how my body 
changes when I am angry” and self-regulation “I can use my breath to reduce tension” (Mehling, 
Price, Daubenmier, Acree, Bartmess, & Stewart; 2012). These items are aimed at addressing 
behaviors and beliefs that would be employed by those with greater IA and may reflect the 
likelihood that interoceptive information is consciously considered, or interoceptive sensibility. This 
measure may have greater ecological validity than the MTM or HDT by capturing more data about 
how somatic signals are interpreted and used rather than just how well signals are or are not 
perceived (Mehling et al., 2012; Schandry, 1981). 
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Awareness of the internal signs of emotion has been related to the intensity of the subjective 
experience of emotion (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011) or the lack 
thereof (Murphy et al., 2018). As afferent somatic information reaches the brain, IA mediates the 
level of activation of the associated neural structures of emotion (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007). One study compared those with high IA, 
as measured by the MTM, versus those with low IA on how their subjective experience of emotion 
while being presented with pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007). 
It was expected, based on somatic theories of emotion, that those with high IA would be more 
sensitive to the somatic markers of emotion and thus experience higher subjective levels of emotion. 
This hypothesis was confirmed via self-report and via increased activation of associated neural 
structures as measured by electroencephalogram (EEG; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007). In all picture 
conditions, positive, negative, or neutral, the high IA groups showed greater activation of the 
prefrontal cortices and somatosensory cortices, structures associated with top-down regulation and 
perception of somatic sensory input respectively. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), associated 
with interpreting the emotional salience of stimuli, showed more activation in the high IA group, but 
only for pleasant and unpleasant pictures and not for neutral pictures. The insula, a structure 
associated with integration of somatic information, showed greater activation in the high IA group 
but only during negative picture presentation (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007). Other studies have 
shown this region to be more active overall in those with high IA scores (Critchley et al., 2004). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using HPT and MTM tasks have also found 
the insula and ACC to be key structures that are differentially activated by interoceptive versus 
exteroceptive attention, with increased volumes and connectivity associated with higher IA scores 
(Critchley et al., 2004; Wiebking, Duncan, Tiret, Hayes, Marjaǹska, Doyon, Bajbouj, & Northoff, 
2014). Interestingly, these studies also showed that subjects with higher IA and greater activity in 
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their insula also reported greater general negative affect and greater depressive symptoms (Critchley 
et al., 2004; Wiebking et al., 2014), implying that the interpretation of somatic signals may also play a 
role in psychopathology.  
IA and Psychopathology 
Somatic signals from the body are intimately tied to the experience of emotion and 
expectations of somatic experience, and disruptions in these signals have been associated with 
various pathologies (Dunn et al., 2007; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Harshaw, 2015; Khalsa & Lapidus, 
2016). Increased IA has been associated with stronger autonomic arousal and increases in the 
reported intensity of emotions, both positive and negative (Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Critchley et al., 
2004; Kindermann & Werner, 2014; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007). Reduced awareness of somatic 
signals has been suggested to contribute to anhedonia commonly associated with depression 
(Harshaw, 2015). Both major depression and alexithymia, difficulty identifying or describing one’s 
own feelings, have been correlated with lower IA scores (Dunn et al., 2007; Furman et al., 2013; 
Herbert et al., 2011). Interoceptive accuracy has been shown to be elevated in anxiety related 
disorders (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996; Schmitz, Blechert, Krämer, Asbrand, & 
Tuschen-Caffier, 2012). Using the MTM, Ehlers and Breuer (1992) found that subjects with panic 
disorder were more accurate in counting their heartbeats than those with other anxiety disorders, 
depression, or healthy controls. The authors theorize that this could be driven in part by self-
oriented attention in anticipation of upcoming panic attacks (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996). This concept 
was reinforced by Sturges & Goetsch (1996), who showed that anxiety sensitivity, fear of the 
experience of anxiety symptoms, predicted higher accuracy of heartbeat detection. Other anxiety 
disorders, such as generalized anxiety and social phobias, have also displayed higher IA than healthy 
controls (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Schmitz et. al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2011). This has been proposed 
to be due in part to the self-oriented attention common to anxiety increasing likelihood that somatic 
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signals come into conscious perception, and anxiety increasing heart rate to the point that it is easier 
to then perceive (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996; Stevens et. al., 2011).  
IA has also been shown to be lower in those that are more likely to have a disrupted or 
distant relationship to their body due to weight. BMI has been shown to be negatively correlated 
with IA scores in overweight and obese groups but not the healthy controls (Herbert & Pollatos, 
2014). Eating disorders, anorexia nervosa and bulimia, have been associated with lower IA as 
measured by both self-report and the MTM (Fassino, Pierò, Gramaglia, & Abbate-Daga, 2004; 
Pollatos, Kurz, Albrecht, Schreder, Kleemann, Schöpf, Kopietz, Wiesmann, & Schandry, 2008). In 
particular self-objectification, the tendency to experience one’s body principally as an object to be 
judged for its appearance, is commonly associated with eating disorders and has been negatively 
correlated with IA (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013). In each of these groups where a person may be more 
likely to feel distinct from or at odds with their physical self, both behavioral and self-report 
measures of IA have been shown to be lower.  
The insula is the region of the brain that aggregates afferent somatic signals and transmits 
this data to the frontal cortex so it can be perceived and is believed to play a key role in addiction 
(Naqvi & Bechara, 2009). Subjects who experienced damage to their insula, an area associated with 
integration of somatic information and IA (Critchley et al., 2004), were able to quit smoking more 
easily (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, & Bechara, 2007), or experienced no cravings when they quit 
smoking (Gray & Critchley, 2007). Somatic information can then be said to play a strong role in the 
experience of craving among addicts, and IA is likely dysregulated, alternately increased or 
decreased, by different phases of the addiction cycle (Goldstein, Bechara, Garavan, Childress, 
Paulus, & Volkow, 2009). Labeling and understanding somatic cues is a key aspect to some drug 
treatment programs (Najavits, 2002). Increasing interoceptive accuracy through body-oriented 
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mindfulness training was found in one small study to promote relapse prevention (Price & Smith-
DiJulio, 2016).  
Understanding the role that afferent somatic information plays in various psychopathologies 
can elucidate the role that this information plays in healthy day to day life, and how disruptions or 
deficits the perception of this information may impact healthy functioning. As pathological 
disturbances dysregulate the accurate perception of signals from the body, reducing IA, they impact 
both subjective experience and behavior in ways that may not be immediately apparent. One such 
possible outcome of dysregulated perception of internal feedback would be an impairment of 
implicit learning that is done outside of consciousness (Bechara, 2004; Furman et. al., 2013). 
Risk 
Afferent somatic information provides a perceptual framework for experience which, when 
unavailable or unreliable, can contribute to pathology but when available and accurate contributes to 
decision-making in the form of insight or “gut feelings” (Katkin et al., 2001). Decisions are rarely 
made in a purely rational, consequence-based fashion (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
Emotion often plays a stronger role than purely cognitive appraisal in determining behavioral 
responses to risk (Loewenstein et al., 2001). As the connection between available choices and 
positive outcomes becomes less clear, emotion plays an even larger role in decision-making (Isen & 
Means, 1983; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Damasio (1994) referred to the somatic changes felt during 
decision-making as anticipatory emotions and proposed, based on his research, they were an 
experiential representation of expected outcomes of that decision. This theory was supported by 
Bechara and colleague’s (1997) study using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).  
In a study by Bechara and colleagues’ (1997) subjects with lesions in their ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) were compared against normal healthy controls on their performance of 
the IGT. During each trial of the IGT subjects are shown four decks of playing cards and asked to 
SMART CHOICES WHEN FACED WITH RISK 
 
19 
choose one; two of the decks are safe decks, providing consistent low rewards, and two of the decks 
are risky decks, providing larger rewards but occasionally resulting in very large penalties. In the 
Bechara (1997) study healthy subjects displayed autonomic arousal prior to risky choices, as 
measured by SCRs, compared to subjects with lesions in their vmPFC who showed no autonomic 
arousal. The healthy subjects who developed autonomic arousal prior to risky choices learned to 
avoid the risky decks, and eventually earned more facsimile money on the task. The lesioned subjects 
who did not show autonomic arousal prior to making risky decisions did not learn to avoid the risky 
decks and over time earned less facsimile money (Bechara et al., 1997). Bechara also showed that 
subjects with vmPFC lesions exhibited difficulty making decisions when outcomes were unclear in 
real-world tasks such as making plans, choosing friends and partners, or organizing social activities 
(Bechara, 2004; Bechara et al., 2002). 
According to Bechara (1997), healthy subjects who exhibited autonomic arousal before 
making risky choices began avoiding the risky choices before consciously knowing why they were 
doing so. This sort of learning, where problems are solved or decisions made about the environment 
independently from conscious effort, is called implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Bechara’s (1997) 
assertion that these decisions were made prior to conscious understanding for why they were being 
done has since drawn criticism (Maia & McClelland, 2004). Subsequent use of the IGT using more 
concrete questions for the subjects regarding what they knew about the task and when, compared to 
Bechara’s (1997) use of more open-ended questions, showed that subjects avoided risky choices 
when they consciously knew to do so (Maia & McClelland, 2004). This finding could imply that 
somatic feedback does inform decision-making, but in a manner similar to earlier theories of 
emotion where internal somatic feedback must first occur (autonomic arousal) and a cause for the 
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feeling state attributed (the risky decks) prior to corrective action being taken (choosing less 
risk)(Damasio et al., 1996; James, 1884; Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
Decision-making, particularly when there is an element of risk, has been tied to the 
activation of regions in the brain associated with the integration of somatic information (Paulus, 
Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003). One study, using fMRI and a decision-making 
involving risk, found a strong inverse relationship between insula activation and risky behavior 
(Paulus et al., 2003). In their study the right anterior insula was activated prior to risky choices but 
not safe ones, and the degree of activation predicted both their rate of learning to make safe choices 
in the decision-making task, and their likelihood of avoiding risk in general according to self-report 
questionnaires (Paulus et al., 2003). This region of the brain has also been shown to play a role both 
in the assessment of risk (Werner, Schweitzer, Meindl, Duschek, Kambeitz, & Schandry, 2013) and 
in the integration of somatic information (Hassanpour, Yan, Wang, Lapidus, Arevian, Simmons, 
Feusner, & Khalsa, 2016). Together this research further connects successful avoidance of risk with 
the experience of somatic information. 
Stress 
Stress can greatly influence the capacity to perceive somatic information, either elevating 
interoception when stress draws attention to the self or decreasing it almost entirely when attention 
is focused somewhere else (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Increases in heart rate and blood pressure 
produced by sympathetic activation can make heart rate easier to detect (Moor et. al., 2005; 
Schandry, Bestler, and Montoya, 1993; Schandry & Specht, 1981), but attention is more likely to be 
focused on salient aspects of the stressor while peripheral information, such as signals from the 
body, are less likely to be noticed or integrated (Erickson, Drevets, & Schulkin, 2003; Schulz & 
Vögele, 2015) Laboratory research on IA has been confounded by the fact that acute stress 
inductions can increase or decrease IA (Ainley et al., 2012; Durlik, Brown, & Tsakiris, 2014; Preston, 
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Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007; Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Chronic stress can dysregulate the 
mechanisms of arousal, altering the physiological baseline and desensitizing receptors to signals of 
sympathetic activation.  
Acute stress inductions have been shown to increase or decrease IA, depending on the focus 
of the stressor (Ainley et al., 2013; Preston et al., 2007; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992). Public speaking, 
either the anticipation or performance thereof, has been used to induce stress and shown to increase 
interoceptive accuracy (Durlik et. al., 2014; Schandry & Specht, 1981). Other lab stress inductions 
such as mental arithmetic tasks (Smith, 1967) have been shown to have no effect on IA (Gray, 
Taggart, Sutton, Groves, Holdright, Bradbury, Brull, & Critchley, 2007; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992) or 
to decrease it (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007). It is worth noting that in these studies other measures 
than the MTM were used, such as electroencephalography to detect heartbeat evoked potentials 
(Gray et al., 2007). Some researchers have suggested that this may be an effect of where the stressors 
place the subject’s attention (Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013). 
Public speaking is stressful because it invites attention and scrutiny toward the self (Durlik et al., 
2014), not unlike how subjects with panic disorder focused attention on themselves in anticipation 
of panic attacks (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996). This theory is supported by research that shows self-
referential attention, through writing of a narrative or looking at one’s self in the mirror, has been 
shown to experimentally increase IA scores without any stress induction (Ainley et al., 2012; Ainley 
et al., 2013). As stress focuses attention the stressor to the exclusion of peripheral information 
(Erickson et al., 2003) self-oriented stressors could increase IA to the exclusion of other pertinent 
cues, and externally focused stressors would focus attention on their pertinent features potentially at 
the expense of somatic feedback. This could explain some of the findings on the effects of chronic 
life stressors on IA. 
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Chronic stress does not have a clear relationship to IA (Schulz et al., 2013; McEwen, 2000). 
While acute stress activation can lead to stronger and more easily detected somatic signals (Moor et 
al., 2005) chronic stress can result in a blunted reaction to acute stress; this may be partially due to 
stress “tolerance” where the body has grown accustomed to sympathetic activation, and partially due 
to a reduction of the physical resources required for arousal (McEwen, 2000; Schulz et al., 2013; Tak 
& Rosmalen, 2010). In both cases the sensitivity to changes in somatic information could become 
attenuated.  
As stress increases to the point of becoming traumatic somatic cues from the body, due to 
their intensity and association with the trauma stimulus, become themselves aversive stimuli that are 
progressively numbed and at a certain point dissociated from entirely. Indeed, complex PTSD (C-
PTSD) which is associated with exposure to particularly severe, interpersonal, and chronic stress 
(Herman, 2015) is strongly associated with dissociation, a psychological removal from one’s physical 
body and experience (Ford & Courtois, 2014). PTSD has been linked to a reduced ability to 
recognize and articulate subjective emotional experience (Van Der Kolk, 2006), with some studies 
showing an increase in the numbing of emotional affect as the intensity and duration of trauma 
exposure increases (D'Andrea, Pole, DePierro, Freed, & Wallace, 2013). Some therapies for 
traumatic stress include practice identifying somatic markers of emotion to facilitate the experience 
and processing of emotion (Rothschild, 2000). Building on these observations, long-term, but non-
traumatic, stressors such as life events may illustrate more accurately the effects environmental 
stressors have on IA outside of the bias that short-term experimental interventions have by 
increasing heart rate and self-oriented attention.  
Stress and Decision-Making 
Stress in general has been shown to have a negative impact on decision-making, and there 
are several factors that are hypothesized to contribute to this effect (Preston et al., 2007; Starcke & 
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Brand, 2012). Stress has been shown to impair decision-making by increasing the likelihood that a 
choice is made before all alternatives are considered (Keinan, 1987).  Some researchers have 
hypothesized that this effect is driven in part by stressful events requiring attentional resources 
(Klein & Boals, 2001). By this hypothesis internalized representations of the stressor occupy 
attentional resources relative to their emotional salience, leaving less attentional resources available 
for other tasks (Klein &Boals, 2001). Stress inductions, such as the anticipation of public speaking, 
have been shown to result in more risky and fewer safe choices when compared to control groups 
(Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). In a study by Starcke and colleagues (2008) levels of 
salivary cortisol were correlated with the amount of risky choosing on a dice-based gambling task. 
Administration of cortisol, using oral capsules, was shown in one study to increase risky choosing 
compared to controls, particularly when the potential rewards were higher (Putman, Antypa 
Crysovergi, & van der Does, 2010). This corroborates other studies have suggested that stress 
increases reward sensitivity, and thus likelihood of choosing based on immediate gratification 
(Starcke & Brand, 2012; Oliver, Wardle, & Gibson, 2000). Some studies have also shown a gender 
effect on how stress effects decision-making, where men showed an increase in risky decision-
making while under stress whereas women decreased their risky decision-making (Lighthall, Mather, 
& Gorlick, 2009; Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009). 
Whether there is a direct negative influence of stress from life events on decision-making has 
been debated (Baradell & Klein, 1993; Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, life event stress has been 
shown to reduce working memory (Klein & Boals, 2001). Reductions in working memory have been 
shown to negatively impact decision-making during risk (Cui, Wang, Shi, Liu, Chen, & Chen, 2015). 
While the direct effect has been debated, life event stress would increase stress overall which has 
been shown to impair decision-making (Starcke et al., 2008), and decision-making during risk (Miu et 
al., 2008). 
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A previous analysis attempted to determine how life event stress affected the relationship 
between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk (Nicholson, Birk, & Bonanno, 2017). Building 
on prior research (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara, 2004) the presence of autonomic arousal predicted 
subjects’ ability to learn to avoid risk, but this relationship did not hold true for subjects who 
reported greater amounts of life stress (Nicholson et al., 2017). Among subjects who reported less 
negative and more positive life events in the previous four months on the Life Experiences Survey 
(LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978) showed a relationship where greater autonomic arousal 
before making risky choices on the IGT predicted faster learning to avoid risk (Nicholson et al., 
2017). However, subjects who reported more negative life events in the previous four months, and 
only this group, showed no significant relationship between their level of autonomic arousal prior to 
making risky choices and learning to avoid risk. Life event stress moderated the relationship between 
arousal and implicitly learning to avoid risk, as shown in Fig. 1. Those who experienced more 
positive life events had the strongest relationship between arousal levels and rate of learning to avoid 
risk, and those with more negative life events showed no relationship between arousal and learning 
to avoid risk (Nicholson et al., 2017).  
At present, how non-pathologic life event stress affects decision-making during risk remains 
unknown. Stress has been shown to negatively affect decision-making (Starcke & Brand, 2012) and 
decision-making during risk in particular (Miu et al., 2008; Preston et al., 2007). Perception of 
somatic markers of arousal, even when outside of conscious awareness but recognized by regions of 
the brain that integrate afferent somatic information, is believed to be a necessary component in the 
relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk in tasks like the IGT (Werner et 
al., 2013). Those with higher IA as measured by accurate perception of cardiac signals have been 
shown to avoid risk more overall than those with lower cardiac perception (Werner et al., 2009). The 
next step in this line of research is to determine if stress affects decision-making by reducing IA. If 
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so this could be done either implicitly, by affecting sensitivity to somatic markers of arousal, or 
explicitly, by focusing attention on stress-relevant data to the exclusion of somatic feedback. Either 
or both of these could cause life event stress to impede the relationship typically seen between 
autonomic arousal and implicitly learning to avoid risk.  
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to address this knowledge gap by examining the impact of external 
and non-acute stress on the use of IA in learning to avoid risk. It was hypothesized that 1) subjects 
with more self-reported life event stress would have lower scores of IA compared to subjects with 
less life event stress, 2) compared to subjects with lower IA scores, those with higher IA would 
show faster rates of learning on the IGT, 3) IA scores would moderate the relationship between 
autonomic arousal and rate of learning, and 4) life event stress would moderate the capacity for IA 
to moderate autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk, as shown in Fig. 2.  
 
Method 
 This is a secondary analysis of a previously completed study conducted at Teacher’s College, 
Columbia University. Reporting of the primary findings is still in progress. Post hoc analysis of the 
de-identified data was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the City College of New York. 
Participants 
A community sample of 96 healthy adults responded to advertisements online and were 
compensated financially for participation. Four subjects fell asleep during the tasks and were 
removed from analysis. Subsequently after missing data and outliers were removed there were a total 
of 86 (54 females; Mage = 27.55 years; SDage = 6.56 years) subjects who were used in this analysis. 
Reasons for their removal from analysis are discussed in more detail below. The racial makeup of 
the group was 35% Asian, 26% Black, 35% White, 1% identified as multi-racial, and 4% chose not 
to identify. Subjects who identified as Hispanic or Latino comprised 15% of the sample, and 2% 
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chose not to answer this question. Before data collection all study procedures were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of Teacher’s College, Columbia University. All subjects gave their written 
informed consent prior to beginning the study. 
Physiological Recordings 
 After giving their informed consent subjects had sensors attached to them to collect 
physiological data. Electrocardiography and electrodermal activity was recorded using a wireless 
BioPac MP150 unit (BioPac, Goleta, CA) and the AcqKnowledge 4.3.1 program. For each of the 
two physiological channels a small BioNomadix transmitter was secured to the subject with Velcro 
straps. Wires ran from this transmitter to the electrodes held against the subjects’ skin with adhesive. 
Data from each channel was recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz and transmitted wirelessly to 
the BioPac MP150 unit behind a screen several feet away. Two subjects had faulty SCL data and 
were not used in the analyses. 
To measure electrocardiographic data (ECG) three Ag/AgCl electrodes were placed on the 
participants’ front torso: below the clavicle and slightly to the center of the deltoid muscle on either 
side, and one in line with the navel but beneath the subject’s left ribs. Each electrode had a 1 cm 
diameter contact point that was pre-gelled with a 7% chloride gel. After the experiment this data was 
downsampled to 400 Hz. Heart rate was then calculated by identifying R-spikes using ANSLAB, a 
suite of open-source Matlab routines used for analyzing physiological data (Wilhelm & Peyk, 2005), 
followed by final visual inspection by a trained research assistant to correct any artifacts. 
Changes in skin conductance level (SCL) were measured in microSiemens (𝜇S) as a reliable 
indicator of autonomic activation (Dawson et al., 2007). After cleaning the area with a disposable 
pre-moistened wipe, two Ag/AgCl electrodes, pre-gelled with 0.5% chloride isotonic gel, were 
attached to the base of the palm on the subject’s non-dominant hand. Prior to each task the 
electrode clips were detached from the electrodermal electrode stickers to establish a baseline of 0-
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S. After the experiment this data was downsampled to 10 Hz, and linearly de-trended on a trial-by-
trial basis.  
Before beginning the tasks, a trained research assistant would inspect the physiological data 
in real time using the AcqKnowledge program to confirm a clear signal. 
Behavioral Tasks 
Mental Tracking Method. To measure IA researchers used the MTM, developed by 
Schandry (1981). Participants were seated in front of a computer and asked to count their heartbeats 
silently without taking their pulse or holding their breath. A sound cue indicated when they were to 
start counting, and a different sound cue indicated when to stop. After each counting phase subjects 
entered the number of heartbeats they counted on the computer. There were three counting phases 
of different lengths: 25, 35, & 45 seconds, with a 30 second resting period between each counting 
phase. The order that the counting phases were presented in was randomized. IA was calculated 
using the following equation:  
1/3 (1-(recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats)/recorded heartbeats). 
Three subjects did not enter an answer for 1 or more trials of the MTM and were thus not included 
in the analyses. 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). A computerized version of the standardized IGT (Bechara et 
al., 1997) was administered. Subjects were given instructions that on each trial they were to choose 
one of four decks of cards, each labeled A, B, C, or D. Subjects started the task with $2000 of 
facsimile money and instructed to maximize their earnings. They were also reminded the money was 
fake and their final amount at the end of the task would have no bearing on their financial 
compensation for participating in the study. Before each trial was a 3-second anticipation screen, 
wherein the subject could see the cards they would be choosing from and their current score but 
they could not yet make a choice. After 3-seconds the subject was permitted to make a choice during 
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the choice screen, indicated by a change in background color, and this screen was presented until the 
subject made a choice of one of the four decks. When two of the decks, C & D, would receive larger 
immediate rewards (eg. $100 or $150) but would sporadically also receive a large penalty (eg. $1250) 
such that over time choosing from these decks resulted in a net loss. These decks were considered 
risky. When choosing the other two decks, A & B, subjects would receive smaller immediate rewards 
(eg. $25 or $50) but also much smaller, albeit more regular, penalties (eg. $0 or $50), so that 
choosing from these decks repeatedly resulted in a net gain. This task was administered for 100 
trials.  
In keeping with prior analyses (Bechara & Martin, 2004; Werner et al., 2013) a score to 
determine smart choosing was calculated by first breaking the 100 trials into 5 blocks of 20 trials 
each, and for each block of 20 trials subtracting the number of risky choices from the number of 
safe choices [(A + B) – (C + D)]. Performance scores below zero indicate a greater number of risky 
choices for that block, while scores above zero indicate a greater number of safe choices. Rates of 
smart choosing for each block were then used to compute two more variables. For each subject the 
smart choosing scores for each of the five blocks were averaged together to create an overall smart 
choosing score. The slope of learning for each participant was computed as the slope of the line that 
fit the five points representing safe choosing over the five blocks of the task. A larger slope means 
the participant learned faster to choose the safe decks. One subject was removed from analysis due 
to an extreme outlier score on this variable. 
Questionnaires 
 After other experimental tasks, a series of pen-and-pencil questionnaires were completed by 
participants.  
Life Experiences Survey. The Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason et al., 1978) is a 50-
item questionnaire that lists a series of impactful life events, both positive and negative, and subjects 
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were asked to indicate whether these events occurred to them in the previous four months. These 
events included “marriage,” “death of a spouse,” “major change in sleeping habits,” “new job,” and 
others. If the event had occurred to them the subject would indicate on a seven-point Likert scale 
their how positive or negative that experience was (-3 = extremely negative, -2 = moderately negative, -1 = 
somewhat negative, 0 = no impact, +1 = slightly positive, +2 = moderately positive, +3 = extremely positive). The 
final three questions are blank so subjects can include other major life events that are not listed and 
indicate how these events impacted them. This questionnaire was chosen because it allows for a 
delineation between the number of recent events and the intensity of their subjective impact, 
without assuming that certain events would be either positive or negative. These scores were 
calculated to determine what impact non-traumatic life event stressors, either in their number or 
their cumulative subjective valence, may have on interoception and decision-making. 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory. A subscale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was administered in hard-copy format along with the other 
questionnaires. 20 of the 40 items of this self-report questionnaire was used to assess trait anxiety, or 
more stable trends in one’s general anxiety levels (Spielberger et al., 1970). Subjects were given 20 
statements and asked to respond on a 4-point Likert scale with the answer that best indicates how 
they “generally feel,” (1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost always).  
Attentional Control Scale. To assess the impact that the capacity to selectively deploy 
attention may have on the variables of interest a hard-copy version of the Attentional Control Scale 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). This self-report questionnaire has 20 items that subjects respond to with 
a 4-point Likert scale indicating the extent to which they agree with the statement (1 = almost never, 2 
= sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = always). Of the 20 items, 11 are reverse-coded. This measure has been 
shown to be reliably divided into 2 sub-scales, attentional focusing and attentional shifting 
(Ólafsson, Smári, Guðmundsdóttir, Ólafsdóttir, Harðardóttir, & Einarsson, 2011). Attentional 
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focusing is described as the ability to willfully maintain focus despite distraction and has shown a 
negative relationship to anxiety symptoms (Ólafsson et al., 2011). Attentional shifting is described as 
the ability to intentionally shift attention between competing stimuli and has shown a negative 
relationship to symptoms of depression (Ólafsson et al., 2011).  
Procedure 
 Subjects were recruited through flyers around the Columbia University campus and postings 
on craigslist.com. As interoception is greatly impacted by psychiatric conditions only healthy 
subjects with no history of psychopathology were used. When potential subjects called the lab they 
were first given a brief phone screen to rule out those with serious physical health issues or a history 
of psychopathology, and to confirm normal or corrected to normal eyesight. If they met screening 
criteria subjects were scheduled to come in to the lab for the experiment. First the subjects gave 
their written informed consent for the study. Then they were attached to the physiological 
equipment as described above, with electrode stickers attached at three points on their torso to 
collect ECG data and two electrode stickers on the palm of their non-dominant hand to collect SCL 
data. Once accurate physiological signals were confirmed the subjects first performed the two 
computer tasks: the MTM and the IGT. After these tasks and other tasks not relevant to this study 
physiological sensors were removed, and the subjects completed printed versions of a demographic 
questionnaire, the LES, the STAI, and the ACS. All data analyses were subsequently completed 
using SPSS version 25.  
Data Analysis 
 First each variable will be calculated and general trends assessed. A smart choosing score was 
calculated for each block of the IGT by taking the total number of safe choices and subtracting the 
total number of risky choices. These scores for each of the 5 blocks were then averaged together to 
create an overall smart choosing score. A 5 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the factors 
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of block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and deck type (safe, risky) to determine if there were statistically significant 
changes in the patterns of choosing over the course of the IGT.  
For each trial of the IGT, SCL was collected over a 3-second anticipation window prior to 
each trial of the IGT was averaged to collect any anticipatory responses, see Fig. 3. These 
anticipatory SCL scores were then averaged together for all trials where risky choices were made, 
and all trials where safe choices were made to create average SCL scores prior to risky choices and 
safe choices for each subject. These risky and safe SCL scores were then compared using paired 
samples t-test. The difference between SCL prior to risky and safe trials was calculated for each 
subject, to create a final SCL score.  
To test the hypotheses that IA will be negatively correlated with LES appraisal scores and 
positively correlated with smart choosing, a bivariate correlation was then run on all the variables of 
interest. These included: IA scores, LES appraisal scores, the number of negative and positive events 
reported on the LES, trait anxiety scores on the STAI, focusing and shifting subscales of the ACS, 
average difference in SCL prior to choosing (bad minus good), overall smart choosing score, smart 
choosing scores for each of the 5 blocks, and slope of learning. 
 Based on the correlations, a linear regression was run with the dependent variable of overall 
smart choosing, and the independent variables IA, LES appraisal, and SCL. Given that the 
dependent variables correlated with smart choosing scores differently depending on the block, this 
linear regression was repeated with the same independent variables IA, LES appraisal, and SCL, but 
with the dependent variables of smart choosing score for each of the 5 blocks. A linear regression 
was also run with the dependent variable slope of learning, and the same independent variables IA, 
LES appraisal, and SCL. 
 Expanding on previous studies LES appraisal scores were tested as a moderator of the 
relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, see Fig. 4, using the mathematical model and 
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PROCESS macro for SPSS proposed by Hayes (2017). To test the hypothesis that IA would 
moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk, IA examined first 
as a moderator of the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, see Fig. 5, then as 
possibly moderating the relationship between SCL and slope of learning, see Fig. 6. Based on these 
findings the hypothesized moderated moderation where LES appraisal scores would moderate IA’s 
moderation of the relationship between SCL and smart choosing was not conducted. 
Results 
Decision-making performance 
Behavioral performance on the IGT was calculated as the average number of safe and risky 
choices for all participants across each of the 5 blocks of 20 trials, see Fig. 7. A 5 x 2 repeated-
measures ANOVA with the factors of block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) by deck type (safe, risky) showed no 
significant effect for choice (p=.117), but a significant interaction for choice x block, F(4, 340)= 
5.868, p < .001, 2 = .065. This indicates that while subjects did not choose either deck more overall 
(p=.117), they learned to choose the safe decks more often as the blocks progressed (p<.001), see 
Fig. 8. A paired-samples t-test comparing safe (A & B) and risky (C & D) choices for each block 
showed significant differences only on Block 1 where subjects chose risky decks (M=11.56, 
SD=2.88) more than safe decks (M=8.44, SD=2.88), t(85)= -5.02, p < .001, and for Block 2 where 
risky deck choices (M=11.26, SD=3.94) outnumbered safe deck choices (M=8.74, SD=3.94), 
t(85)=-2.95, p=.004. The number of risky versus safe deck choices was not statistically significant for 
Block 3, p=.355, Block 4, p=.588, or Block 5, p=.718.  
 Smart choosing scores were calculated each block by subtracting the number of risky choices 
from the number of safe choices. An overall smart choosing score was calculated for each subject by 
averaging their smart choosing scores for each block. These scores passed the Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normal distribution (p=.236) and showed no differences by gender, p= .80.  
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Slope of learning scores for each participant were computed using the five points 
representing safe choosing over the five blocks of the task and calculating the slope of the line that 
connects those five points. A larger slope means the participant learned faster to choose the safe 
decks. Slope of learning scores did not pass the Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p= .027), 
but showed no differences between genders, p=.773. 
Skin conductance level 
 Before each trial of the IGT was a 3-second anticipation period where the subject could see 
4 decks of cards but could not yet make a choice. SCL data collected during this anticipation period 
was averaged for each trial. A paired samples t-test comparing the averaged SCL for all participants 
prior to safe deck choices (M=5.09, SD=5.17) and risky deck choices (M=5.15, SD=5.15) were not 
significant, p=.245. To capture differences in the elevation of SCL prior to risky choices compared 
to that of safe choices, for each subject their average SCL prior to making safe choices was 
subtracted from their average SCL prior to risky choices. This final SCL score did not pass tests for 
normal distribution (p<.001), and showed no gender differences, p=.225. While outliers for this 
score were present, they represented accurate physiological response data so no changes were made 
to the SCL scores.  
Interoceptive Awareness 
 IA scores were calculated using the standard scoring method for the MTM (Schandry, 1981). 
Two values were removed due to being outliers. After these corrections IA scores passed the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p=.938) and showed no difference between genders, 
p=.214. In accordance with the previous studies (Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005; Werner et al., 
2009) a cut-off score of 0.85 to assign participants to either high ( .85) or low (.85) groups was 
considered. However, only 3 subjects met criteria for the high IA group, so the raw scores were used 
in all subsequent calculations including IA. 
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Life Experiences Survey 
 LES responses were calculated to assess the number of negative events, the number of 
positive events, and the sum of the subjective appraisals for all events that had occurred to each 
subject. In the 4 months prior to the study 78 subjects reported experiencing positive events 
(Mpos=5.10, SDpos=3.38), and 79 subjects reported negative events in the prior 4 months (Mneg=4.09, 
SDneg=2.91). All subjects had their subjective appraisals for all events added together to create a LES 
appraisal variable, which passed Shapiro-Wilk test for normal distribution (p=.362) and was not 
significantly different between genders, p=.443. Based on previous research (Clements & Turpin, 
2000) LES appraisal scores were compared in a bivariate correlation to raw SCL levels prior to safe 
choices (p=.552), prior to risky choices (p=.541), and the difference in SCL between risky and safe 
choices (p=.875), and no relationship was found between these scores. 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
 Scores for the STAI’s trait anxiety subscale were collected to assess levels of trait anxiety in 
the subjects. Scores did not pass the Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p=.045) and were not 
significantly different between genders, p=.268. 
Attentional Control Scale 
 Subscales of the ACS, focusing and shifting, were calculated from the subject responses. 
Both ACS focusing (p=.312) and ACS shifting (p=.120) passed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normal 
distribution and neither showed gender differences, ps >.100.  
Aim 1. Is interoceptive awareness affected by life event stress?  
 The first hypothesis, that IA would be affected by life event stress, was disconfirmed by the 
results. A correlation analysis showed no relationship between IA as measured by the MTM and life 
event stress as measured by scores on the LES. 
Aim 2. Does interoceptive awareness impact the rate of implicit learning?  
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 The second hypothesis, that those with higher IA would show faster rates of learning on the 
IGT, was disconfirmed. Correlation analysis showed no relationship between scores for IA and 
slope of learning. Multiple regression analysis also confirmed IA scores did not predict slope of 
learning, as is detailed below.  
A series of bivariate correlations were conducted to explore any possible relationships 
between all the variables of interest: age, education level, IA, overall smart choosing, slope of 
learning, SCL (risky minus safe), the number of positive events reported on the LES, the number of 
negative events reported on the LES, LES appraisal scores, STAI trait anxiety, ACS focusing, and 
ACS shifting, see Table 1. Using a Pearson correlation age was significantly correlated with 
education, r(86)=.282, p=.008, and negatively correlated with IA, r(86)=-.285, p=.008. Education 
was also correlated with ACS focusing scores, r(86)=-.241, p=.026. In addition to age, IA was 
significantly correlated to overall smart choosing but in the opposite direction as anticipated, r(86)=-
.259, p=.016, see Fig. 9. IA was also correlated to ACS shifting scores r(86)=-.249, p=.021, and no 
other variables. smart choosing overall was also correlated with slope of learning, r(86)=.474, 
p<.001, and SCL, r(86)=.375, p<.001. SCL during the 3 second anticipation period, using the 
difference between the average of SCL prior to risky choices minus the average prior to safe choices, 
was positively correlated to overall smart choosing, r(86)=.375, p<.001; slope of learning, r(86)=.363, 
p=.001; and ACS focusing scores r(86)=.231, p=.032. LES appraisal scores were positively correlated 
with the number positive life events, r(86)=.706, p<.001, and negatively correlated with negative life 
events, r(86)=-.672, p<.001. Trait anxiety scores on the STAI were positively correlated with the 
number of negative life events on the LES, r(86)=.374, p<.001; negatively correlated with LES 
appraisal scores, r(86)=-.338, p=.001; ACS focusing scores, r(86)=-.364, p=.001; and ACS shifting 
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scores, r(86)=-.360, p=.001. ACS scores, focusing and shifting, were positively correlated with each 
other, r(86)=.633, p<.001. 
An exploratory inspection of the various blocks of the IGT revealed that these relationships 
between smart choosing and the variables of interest varied over the course of the 100 trials of the 
IGT, see Table 2. During the first 20 trials of the IGT, Block 1, a Pearson correlation showed smart 
choosing1 was not significantly related to IA, p=.094, or SCL, p=.552, but was significantly 
correlated with LES appraisal scores, r(86)=.276, p=.010. In Block 2 smart choosing2 was not 
related to SCL, p=.331, or LES appraisal, p=.621, but was significantly correlated with IA, r(86)=-
.294, p=.006. In Block 3 smart choosing3 was related to IA, r(86)=-.224, p=.038, and SCL, 
r(86)=.351, p=.001. SCL was related to smart choosing in Block 4, r(86)=.462, p<.001, and Block 5, 
r(86)=.324, p=.002. ACS focusing scores were related to smart choosing in Block 4, r(86)=.226, 
p=.028, and no other variables were related to the individual blocks of smart choosing.  
Since age, the number of positive or negative events reported on the LES, trait anxiety, or 
the ACS variables were not significantly related to either overall smart choosing or slope of learning 
they were not included in the subsequent analyses.  
A standard multiple regression analysis was performed between the dependent variable 
(smart choosing) and the independent variables (IA, SCL, LES appraisal). The results were tested 
using a bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples. Regression analysis revealed the model 
significantly predicted smart choosing, F(3, 82)=6.744, p<.001. R2=.198. Of the individual variables 
IA (=-.234, p=.020), and SCL (=.360, p<.001), both significantly predicted overall smart 
choosing. LES appraisal scores, however, were not significant predictors in this model, p=.678. 
 Based on the correlational findings that the independent variables expressed different levels 
of influence on the dependent variable at different stages of the task, the previous regression analysis 
was repeated for each of the 5 blocks of 20 trials of the IGT, see Table 3. For Block 1, the 
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regression model significantly predicted smart choosing1, F(3, 82)=3.313, p=.023, R2=.108. Of the 
variables influencing smart choosing1 IA (p=.109) and SCL (p=.637) were not significant predictors 
but LES appraisal scores were significant (=.269, p=.012). For Block 2, the same regression model 
was significant, F(3, 82)=2.897, p=.040, R2=.096, with only IA predicting smart choosing2 (=-.287, 
p=.008). For Block 3, the model was significant, F(3, 82)=5.420, p=.002, R2=.165. SCL was 
significant in predicting smart choosing3, (=.338, p=.001) as was IA, (=-.204, p=.047), whereas 
LES appraisal was not (p=.698). For Block 4 the model was significant, F(3, 82)=7.946, p<.001, 
R2=.225, with smart choosing4 significantly predicted by SCL (=.455, p<.001), while IA and LES 
appraisal were not (ps >.276). For Block 5 the model was significant, F(3, 82)=3.979, p=.011, 
R2=.127, with only SCL significantly predicting smart choosing5 (=.305, p=.003), while IA and 
LES appraisal did not (ps >.155) did not. Taken together IA, LES appraisal, and SCL impacted 
smart choosing differently at different points in the task. In Block 1 LES was related to smart 
choosing. In Block 2 IA was negatively related to smart choosing. In Block 3 both IA and SCL 
predicted smart choosing, and in Blocks 4 and 5 SCL predicted smart choosing.  
 A multiple regression analysis was performed between the dependent variable slope of 
learning and the independent variables LES appraisal, IA, and SCL. Results were tested using a 
bootstrap estimation with 1000 samples. The model significantly predicted slope of learning F(3, 
82)= 4.952, p=.003. R2=.153. Of the independent variables only SCL significantly predicted slope of 
learning (=.365, p=.001), while LES appraisals and IA were not significant predictors (ps>.150). 
Based on previous findings (Nicholson et al., 2017) a regression analysis was used to 
investigate whether LES appraisal scores conditionally moderated the ability of SCL scores to 
predict overall smart choosing. IA was entered as a covariate since it has been shown to be related to 
the dependent variable. Predictor variables were centered on the mean. The results were tested using 
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a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Overall the model was 
significant, F(4, 81) =4.997, p =.001, R2=.198. The interaction between SCL and LES appraisal 
scores was not significant in accounting for a portion of the variance, R2 <.001, F(1, 81)=.003, 
p=.960, indicating LES appraisal scores do not conditionally moderate the relationship between SCL 
and overall smart choosing. 
Aim 3. Does interoceptive awareness moderate the use of internal feedback in decision-
making? 
This hypothesis was also disconfirmed. Scores for IA were shown to not moderate the 
relationship between SCL and the overall avoidance of risk, as measured by overall smart choosing, 
Fig. 5, or the rate at which subjects learned to avoid risk, as measured by slope of learning, Fig. 6. 
A regression analysis was used to further investigate the hypothesis that IA may moderate 
the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing. Predictor variables were again centered on 
the mean, and results were tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples. The 
model was significant, F(3, 82) =7.213, p <.001, R2=.209. However, the interaction was not 
significant, R2 =.013, F(1, 82)=1.304, p=.257, indicating that IA does not moderate the relationship 
between SCL and overall smart choosing.  
Furthermore, IA did not moderate the relationship between SCL and the slope of learning 
for the gambling task. A regression analysis was used to determine if IA moderated the ability of the 
dependent variable SCL to predict slope of learning. IA and SCL were centered on the mean, and 
results were tested with a bootstrap estimation with 5000 samples. Overall the model was significant, 
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F(3, 82)=4.368, p=.007, R2=.138. However, the interaction was not significant, R2=.006, F(1, 
82)=.594, p=.443, confirming that IA did not moderate the slope of learning for the gambling task. 
Aim 4. Does life event stress moderate the ability of IA to moderate the use of internal 
feedback to inform decision-making? 
Since IA did not moderate the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing or 
between SCL and slope of learning a moderated moderation predicting either variable, Fig. 2, was 
not considered. 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to illustrate the role that interoception plays in decision-making; whether 
changes interoception have an effect on the use of internal feedback and if the conditional effects of 
external stress on internal feedback is due to a disruption of interoception. There is a dearth of 
studies that have looked at the role of interoception in decision-making, and the results have thus far 
been unclear (Werner et al., 2009; Werner et al., 2013). In the present study IA was shown to be 
negatively correlated to the overall choosing of more safe, as opposed to risky, decks on a gambling 
task. Regression analyses showed that increased SCL prior to risky choices compared to safe choices 
predicted overall smart choosing, making more safe than risky choices. Scores of the MTM did not 
moderate the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, or the relationship between SCL 
and the rate of learning ot avoid risk. Breaking the 100 trials of the gambling task into 5 blocks of 20 
showed that the life event stress only had a negative influence on smart choosing during the first 
block, and the inverse relationship between IA as measured by the MTM was limited to blocks 2 and 
3. For the final 3 blocks increased autonomic arousal prior to risky compared to safe choices 
predicted overall avoidance of risky choices.  
Findings did not support the a priori hypotheses. IA, as measured by scores on the MTM, 
was not affected by different levels of life event stress prior to the experiment. IA showed no 
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relationship to slope of learning. The relationship between IA and smart choosing was in the 
opposite direction as expected, and driven by blocks 2 and 3 of the 5-block task. Furthermore, IA 
did not moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal, as measured by SCL, and either 
overall smart choosing or the slope of learning.  
These findings could be in part the result of scores on the MTM being an effective measure 
for interoceptive accuracy specific to cardiac information, but not an effective proxy for sensitivity 
to the holistic range of internal feedback that is interoceptive awareness. MTM scores were 
negatively associated with smart choosing, and for only 2 out of 5 blocks of the IGT. Also, MTM 
scores were not related to either SCL reactions to risk, the slope of learning to avoid risk, or the 
relationship between those 2 factors. Together, these points support the notion that that scores on 
the MTM were not related to sensitivity to, or the use of, internal feedback as measured by SCL. 
Without a measure of IA that uses the same physiological channel that is being used to assess 
autonomic arousal, the hypotheses of this study remain unclear.  
 The findings of this study do point to at least two important possibilities. First, regression 
analyses showed that the negative influence of MTM and LES scores on learning to avoid risk were 
specific to certain time periods over the course of the 100 trials, indicating a possible temporal 
dynamic to their influence. Second, though commonly used as a proxy for IA, scores on the MTM 
were not related to internal feedback outside of heart rate or its use in decision-making, indicating 
this measure is not actually measuring IA but sensitivity to changes in heart rate.  
The findings of the present study could corroborate previous research showing that stress 
can impair decision-making, but interpretation of the findings requires taking into consideration the 
specifics of the task. In this study higher life event stress predicted more risky choosing, but only for 
the first 20 trials of the task. These findings could have been pure chance and would not be present 
upon future replications of the study. However, as other researchers have pointed out (Maia & 
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McClelland, 2004) a choice can only be considered risky once the subject has experienced a loss 
associated with that choice that could outweigh the potential gains. Following the guidelines put 
forward by Bechara (1997) all decks had a set pattern of when they would provide wins and losses. 
Each risky deck did not incur penalties until the 10th time that deck was chosen. From the subject’s 
perspective up until that point those decks were more advantageous. Given the first block consisted 
of 20 trials, it is unlikely any subject would incur more than one penalty in this time. As such the 
observed relationship could be a function of stress increasing reward sensitivity, and thus the 
likelihood of choosing greater short-term rewards, a phenomenon that has been observed in other 
research (Starcke & Brand, 2012; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). 
Other research has found that increased life event stress, even in only the previous 4 
months, can reduce autonomic reactivity to stress-inducing cognitive tasks (Clements & Turpin, 
2000). In the present study an ANOVA confirmed that there were no between-groups differences in 
SCL based on LES scores, p=.104. There could, however, be within-groups differences wherein 
those with higher life event stress have lower autonomic reactivity than they typically have had at 
other points in their lives, but this possibility was not directly tested in the study.  
In the present study regression analyses showed that increased sensitivity to cardiac 
information as measured by the MTM negatively predicted smart choosing, and had the strongest 
impact in blocks 2 and 3. This implies that sensitivity to cardiac information may distract from 
decision-making. It could be that the observed temporal dynamic was the product of pure chance 
and these findings would not be replicated in future administrations of the study. It could be that 
increased sensitivity to cardiac reactions to the gains and losses of the task increased the likelihood 
that these cardiac reactions entered into consciousness, becoming a distraction and promoting 
poorer performance. As the task progressed and subjects became both better at the task and more 
habituated to both wins and losses, together this could lead to lower cardiac reactivity to be 
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distracted by as the task progressed. It could be that, as subjects progressed, significant negative 
consequences were not incurred until blocks 2 and 3, wherein greater sensitivity to one’s own 
reactions would be a distraction during that time. By blocks 4 and 5 subjects could have both 
learned how to avoid these negative consequences and were more habituated to game overall, 
meaning that there was less cardiac reactivity to be distracted by.  
Another possible explanation for the negative relationship between scores on the MTM and 
smart choosing involves the concept of psychological inflexibility (Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, 
Guenole, & Zettle, 2011). Higher IA has been shown to be associated with some psychopathologies, 
particularly those related to anxiety (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996), and in this 
study higher IA was negatively correlated with self-reported ability to shift attention when necessary. 
It is possible that those with higher IA were also more rigid in their choosing strategies, continuing 
to choose the risky decks longer before deciding the short-term benefits did not outweigh the 
occasional losses. The temporal specificity of this effect, blocks 2 and 3, could be a result of those 
with higher IA showing greater psychological inflexibility and continuing to make poor choices 
longer, whereas those with lower IA scores began to make more safe choices during this period. 
However, there was no screening for psychopathology or measure of psychological inflexibility so 
this possible explanation could not be tested. 
 Since the relationship between physiological arousal, as measured by SCL, and learning to 
avoid risk was not related to IA scores this implies that the cardiac sensitivity as measured by the 
MTM is not a reliable marker of interoceptive ability in general. This has been suggested before 
(Khalsa et al., 2008; Ceunen et al., 2013) and there are several reasons why this may be the case. 
Importantly the MTM is a behavioral task that uses explicit attention to measure what is typically an 
implicit process. Somatic markers influence emotional states and decision-making most often 
without explicit conscious recognition of the specific physiological changes (Damasio, 1994; Barrett, 
SMART CHOICES WHEN FACED WITH RISK 
 
43 
2017; Bechara et al., 1997). Elevations in SCL which predicted the likelihood of learning to avoid 
risk in this and previous studies (Bechara et al., 1997) is entirely outside of conscious control or 
perception. Another reason why the MTM may not be an effective proxy for interoception is that 
the task measures sensitivity to one physiological channel, heart rate, whereas multiple physiological 
channels from the body are constantly being integrated to produce an overall subjective sense of 
self. While the MTM is an effective measure of interoceptive accuracy, which is a component of IA, 
there is reason to believe this measure alone may not be an effective proxy for IA as a whole.  
Research Implications  
 The results of this study are at odds with previous research which has shown scores on the 
MTM being associated with improved performance on the IGT (Werner et al., 2009). There may be 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the prior study conducted a between groups analysis with their 
sample evenly divided between those with good or bad IA. Following pre-exiting guidelines 
(Schandry, Sparrer, & Weitkunat, 1986; Pollatos et al., 2005) a cut off score of 0.85 was used and 
those with scores above 0.85 were sorted into the good IA group (N=25) and those with scores 
below were sorted into the bad IA group(N=25). In the present study only 3 subjects scored above 
0.85 on the MTM. Regression analyses used in the current study, while divergent from prior 
findings, may paint a clearer picture of the effect different MTM scores have on decision-making 
compared to a binary between-groups analysis. In the previous study (Werner et al., 2009) subjects 
learned to avoid the risky decks faster, with a greater number of safe choices that became significant 
starting in Block 3. In the present study subjects chose more safe decks over time but the difference 
in choices wasn’t significant. Werner and colleagues used a sample of N=50, where 49 of the 
subjects were university students and 1 was a university employee. The present study used a sample 
that was larger, N=86, and older, M=27.5 years, where only 25% were undergraduate students, and 
40% were employed full time, none at the university. Though contrary to previous research the 
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larger and more diverse sample of the present study may imply greater generalizability to the 
population at large.  
 The findings of this study support previous research indicating that the MTM may not be an 
appropriate measure for interoception in general. Other researchers have noted that the MTM 
measures interoceptive accuracy, which is a component of IA but does not directly imply sensitivity 
to other types of somatic information (Calì et al., 2015; Ceunen et al., 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
The MTM has also, in some studies, shown no relationship to other measures of interoceptive 
accuracy (Schulz et al., 2013; Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999; Kleckner, Wormwood, Simmons, 
Barrett, & Quigley, 2015) except in cases where subjects were either very good or very bad at 
heartbeat detection (Knoll, & Hodapp, 1992). While accuracy in heartbeat detection may be a by-
product of increased IA, there are many factors that can influence MTM scores that do not 
necessarily generalize to sensitivity to, or use of, other somatic information (Brener & Ring, 2016; 
Murphy et al., 2018). Elevated blood pressure, or hypertension, has been linked to increased 
heartbeat perception (O'Brien, Reid, & Jones, 1998; Koroboki, Zakopoulos, Manios, Rotas, 
Papadimitriou, & Papageorgiou, 2010). Lower Body Mass Index (BMI) has been linked to improved 
scores on the HDT (Rouse, Jones, & Jones, 1988). Knowledge about standard resting heart rate has 
also shown to be a potential confound that should be accounted for when using the MTM (Brener 
& Ring, 2016; Murphy et al., 2018). These findings, along with the findings of this study which 
showed no relationship between MTM scores and the use of internal feedback, imply that the MTM 
may not have adequate construct validity to be used as a measure of IA without other corroborating 
measures.  
 Also of note is the temporal specificity of the relationship between SCL and smart choosing. 
In this study regression analyses showed that elevations in SCL specific to risky choosing only 
predicted smart choosing in the second half of the 100 trials. If this pattern persists when replicated 
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by future studies, this could help refine analysis by focusing only on the second half of trials when 
the effect was likely to take place.  
Clinical Implications 
 Potentially relevant to future clinical research is the timing of the influence that MTM scores 
or life event stress. While both life event stress and likelihood of noticing cardiac information 
negatively impacted learning to avoid risk on the IGT, these effects were only present for the first 
half of the 100 trials. In regression analyses the effects of both variables were absent for the final 40 
trials of the task. This implies that while life event stress and sensitivity to cardiac data can impede 
task performance, or implicit learning in particular, these effects may be temporary and diminish 
over time as the task is continued. With respect to decision-making and risk, this implies that 
decisions made quickly are most likely to be negatively influenced by life event stress or sensitivity to 
cardiac arousal data, but given more time the influence of these factors diminishes and internal 
feedback is better able to guide decision-making. This is not unlike how some substance abuse 
treatments (McCauley, Killeen, Gros, Brady, & Back, 2012) encourage patients to “ride the wave” of 
their urges to use; researchers have found that if patients can get through a few minutes without 
acting on their impulse to use the physical urges then subside and they are thereafter in a better 
position to decide what to do next. Similarly, when making decisions riding out the initial reactions, 
wherein choices are more likely to be negatively influenced, can lead to better decision making. This 
approach could have an impact on studies involving any group at greater risk for risky decision-
making, such as those with substance abuse disorders (Bechara & Martin, 2004) or major depression 
(Furman et al., 2013). 
Limitations 
 This study had several strengths and weaknesses that warrant mentioning. Firstly, a total of 
96 subjects were initially recruited, with 86 who could be used for this study, which is nearly double 
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other similar studies (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Preston et al., 2007), and efforts were made to recruit 
a representative community sample. This may then give this study greater generalizability than other 
studies whose populations are more homogenous regarding age (Miu et al., 2008), or education 
levels (Werner et al., 2009). However, this study had no screening for psychopathology. Subjects 
were briefly interviewed over the phone and the screening for pathology consisted of asking each 
subject if they had ever received a psychiatric diagnosis. As such, it is possible that some pathology 
was present in the sample which would skew the results. Even at sub-clinical levels, factors such as 
psychological inflexibility, depression, or anxiety could conceivably influence both interoception or 
risk assessment. As a secondary analysis of existing data there was minimal control over design or 
methodology. 
An exploratory analysis showed that the independent variables each significantly predicted 
the dependent variable smart choosing at different stages of the task. This could imply that different 
factors which affect decision-making do so with different levels of influence at different times the 
longer that a task is maintained. Or these block specific relationships could have been the product of 
pure chance and would not be present in a repetition of the study. 
What is both a limitation and an opportunity of this study is that MTM scores used as a 
proxy for IA showed no relationship to the availability of somatic feedback, as measured by changes 
in SCL prior to risk, or the use of somatic feedback, as measured by slope of learning. The MTM, an 
explicit one-channel behavioral task, does not appear to measure IA, an implicit multi-channel 
process. As such, the central hypotheses of this study remain unanswered. Increases in physiological 
arousal before risk predicted learning to avoid risk, but whether this relationship is affected by 
differences in IA remains unclear.  
 While possibly not an appropriate measure of IA, researchers have found useful covariates 
that increase reliability of the MTM. Murphy and colleagues (2018) found that incorporating a 
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question about knowledge of the average heart rate, and a counting task similar to the MTM, 
controlled for enough of the variance in scores to make the relationship between the MTM and 
scores on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale statistically significant. While the MTM may not be well 
suited for measuring IA in general, taking these measures into account can help for researchers who 
wish to use this measure to assess the accuracy and likelihood of changes in heart rate being noticed. 
This could be of great use for research with populations such as those at risk for panic or anxiety 
attacks or heart attack survivors. Future research into IA could include the MTM with these 
covariates in addition to other measures of IA, such as the MAIA (Mehling, et al., 2012), to acquire a 
more holistic sense of the sensitivity to internal feedback.    
The relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk is susceptible to 
influence from recent life event stress (Nicholson et al., 2017). However, a person is at any moment 
influenced by more than the events of the past few months. Events from throughout the lifespan 
can impact variables relevant to this paradigm such as the availability of autonomic feedback 
(McLaughlin, Sheridan, Alves, & Mendes, 2014), available attentional resources (Pechtel & Pizzagalli, 
2011) or the interpretation of risk (McCrory, De Brito, Sebastian, Mechelli, Bird, Kelly, & Viding, 
2011; McLaughlin et al., 2014; Pechtel & Pizzagalli, 2011). The influence of stressful events from 
throughout the lifespan is unaccounted for in this study.  
Future Directions  
One of the more interesting and exploratory findings of this study was the temporal 
specificity of the influence of the variables on smart choosing scores. This temporal specificity 
should be considered in future research on decision-making to determine if these or other variables 
exert their influence in a temporally dynamic manner or equally over the various trials of a decision-
making task.  
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Future research should expand the scope of life events that may affect decision-making. 
Other measures such as the Stress and Adversity Inventory (Slavich & Epel, 2010) collect 
information about serious events over the lifetime and could be used in conjunction with scales such 
as the Life Events Checklist (Weathers, Blake, Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx, & Keane, 2013) to gain a 
more complete picture of stressful events that may be influencing relevant variables. Clinical studies 
could incorporate data on life events and personal history from structured interviews like the SCID 
(First & Williams, 2016). A wider focus of events that color a person’s interpretation of themselves 
and the world may give a better sense of how life event stress impacts decision-making and the use 
of internal feedback. 
While life event stress moderates the relationship between physical arousal and the rate of 
implicit learning, how this occurs is still not understood. One means that this effect could be taking 
place is through a reduction in attentional resources. Differences in available attentional resources 
could be assessed through a combined administration of the self-report Attentional Control Scale 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and a behavioral measure such as the Stroop color-word task (MacLeod, 
1992). While the changes in internal feedback that guide decision-making are often outside of 
conscious awareness, reductions in available attention could limit the influence of internal feedback 
either by inhibiting resources available for the subconscious integration of afferent somatic signals 
into a holistic sense of self, or by limiting the cognitive resources necessary for this holistic sense of 
self to come into conscious awareness. Differentiating between interference at these levels of 
processing would require neuro-imaging techniques. 
 Cortisol analysis may also give a more concrete view into how a participant’s myriad life 
events are impacting their physical stress levels at the time of assessment. Regardless of the origin of 
the stressor, or bias in the extent to which subjects are willing to admit events are bothering them, 
analysis of salivary cortisol could provide an additional objective measure of stress to use in analysis. 
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Comparisons between subjects at baseline could clarify the relationship between stress and the use 
of internal feedback. In the initial study (Nicholson et al., 2017) the moderation was conditional: 
once life event stress reached a certain level autonomic arousal stopped influencing decision-making. 
Comparisons of salivary cortisol levels could help determine if and at what point baseline stress 
reaches a certain level autonomic arousal stops predicting risk avoidance. A post-task cortisol sample 
could further elucidate what effect stress responses to the task itself had on this relationship.  
Neuro-imaging techniques could further elucidate precisely how those who are under more 
life event stress react differently to risk. Groups that perform well on the IGT, compared to those 
who do not, have shown different patterns of activation when at rest (Schutter & Van Honk, 2005), 
larger P3 amplitudes in the left hemisphere prior to choice (Cui, Chen, Wang, Shum, & Chan, 2013), 
and increased left hemisphere activation in response to losses (Balconi, Finocchiaro, Canavesio, 
Messina, 2014). Like Bechara’s (1997) findings Werner and colleagues (2013) found differences in 
brain activation prior to making risky choices specifically. Functional magnetic imaging showed 
greater blood oxygen levels in the right anterior insula and left postcentral gyrus prior to risky 
decisions but not prior to safe decision-making (Werner et al., 2013). While these findings showed 
no relationship to self-reported state or trait anxiety, there is a dearth of research showing whether 
differences in activation prior to risk are affected by life events. Future research could investigate 
whether the different activation patterns associated with improved performance, or those found 
prior to risky decision-making, are influenced by different levels of life event stress.  
Future research into IA should consider that this is a multi-channel and implicit process and 
should not be measured only using explicit prompts or sensitivity to just one physiological channel. 
Incorporating the covariates mentioned by Murphy and colleagues (2018) would go a long way to 
increasing the reliability of the MTM itself to assess cardiac accuracy. Other measures such as the 
self-report MAIA (Mehling, et al., 2012) or other tasks that specifically measure the influence of 
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sensitivity to somatic feedback, particularly changes that are outside of conscious awareness, may be 
more appropriate for interpreting the in vivo sensitivity to internal feedback that is IA.  
Electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of brain activity may be well suited to measuring 
interoception as a whole. Since the process of interoception is done quickly and mostly out of 
conscious awareness, differences in activation of brain regions associated with the integration of 
afferent somatic information may be a useful indicator of interoceptive ability. The insula, and the 
right insula in particular (Hassanpour, Simmons, Feinstein, Luo, Lapidus, Bodurka, Paulus, & 
Khalsa, 2018), has been shown to be a key region for the integration of affective components 
(Berntson, Norman, Bechara, Tranel, Bruss, & Cacioppo, 2011) and afferent somatic information 
(Hassanpour et al., 2016) into a unified sense of interoception. This region has also been shown to 
be more responsive in those who learned to avoid risk on the IGT (Rudorf, Preuschoff, & Weber 
2012) and may be involved in the use of internal feedback specifically since it has been shown to be 
more active prior to risky choices compared to safe choices, with higher levels of activation 
associated with more safe choices both in a decision-making task and in daily life (Paulus et al., 
2003). Life event stress may influence activation of this or other areas during decision-making that 
involves risk. If life event stress influences the use of internal feedback by altering the interoceptive 
process, there may be differences in the activation of the insula either at baseline or during different 
phases of the IGT. No differences in insula activation between groups with different levels of stress 
across the IGT would strongly imply that life event stress moderates the influence of internal 
feedback without affecting interoception. 
Conclusion  
 In the present study IA, as measured by the MTM, was not related either to life event stress 
or rate of learning. Study findings suggest that different factors significantly impact decision-making 
during risk at different times in the course of the task. The results revealed an initial sequence of 
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negative influence that life event stress, then cardiac accuracy, had on making safe versus risky 
choices. For the second half of the task increases in SCL specific to risk predicted safe versus risky 
choosing. These results might imply that when outcomes are unclear there is a temporal dynamic 
where certain factors, such as increased reward sensitivity due to life stress or sensitivity to 
distraction from cardiac information, may initially impede decision-making. However, as time 
progresses internal feedback plays a larger role in guiding decision-making, resulting in greater 
likelihood of avoiding risk. Research into both improved measures of IA, and the interaction of IA 
with life event stress, warrant future investigation.   
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Table 1  
Bivariate Correlations between Variables of Interest. 
 
Table 1. A correlation matrix featuring all of the factors that were considered for analysis in this 
study. Since age, education, the number of positive or negative events reported on the Life 
Experiences Survey (LES), trait anxiety, or attentional control scores had no relationship to smart 
choosing or slope of learning, they were excluded from subsequent analyses.  
  




Correlations between Variables of Interest and Smart Choosing on Each Block of the IGT. 
 
Table 2. Correlations between interoceptive awareness (IA), differences in skin conductance level 
(risky minus safe)(SCL), the sum appraisals from the Life Experiences Survey (LES) and smart 
choosing (safe minus risky choosing) on the 5 blocks of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). IA is 
correlated with performance only during Blocks 2 & 3, LES during Block 1, and SCL during blocks 
3, 4, and 5. 
  




Differences in the Influence of Predictor Variables over the Course of the Iowa Gambling Task 
 
Table 3. A multiple regression with the predictor variables interoceptive awareness (IA), differences 
in skin conductance level (risky minus safe)(SCL), and sum appraisal scores from the Life 
Experiences Survey (LES), was repeated with the dependent variable of smart choosing for each 
block of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The degree of influence of each variable on the dependent 
variable changed over the course of the task. 
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Figure 1. Findings from Nicholson, Birk, & Bonanno, 2017 Analysis. 
 
Figure 1. In a previous analysis life event stress was shown to moderate the relationship between 
autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized Interaction for this Study. 
 
Figure 2. Building on previous findings, it is hypothesized that life event stress is moderating the 
ability of interoceptive awareness to moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal and 
implicit learning to avoid risk.  
  
SMART CHOICES WHEN FACED WITH RISK 
 
72 
Figure 3. Skin Conductance Level Recording Phase. 
 
Figure 3. During each trial of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), there was an initial anticipation period 
lasting 3 seconds wherein the participant could see the 4 card decks but could not yet make a choice. 
Skin conductance level (SCL) was recorded during this anticipation period, capturing any autonomic 
arousal in response to the impending choice. Overall SCL during this period was averaged for each 
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Figure 4. Life Event Stress Moderating the Relationship between Arousal and Smart Choosing. 
 
Figure 4. Building on prior research that showed life event stress moderated the rate at which implicit 
learning to avoid risk took place, it was hypothesized that life event stress may also moderate the 








Figure 5. IA Hypothetically Moderating the Relationship between Arousal and Smart Choosing. 
 
Figure 5. This conceptual diagram shows the hypothesized interaction where sensitivity to internal 
signs of arousal, interoceptive awareness (IA), may moderate the relationship between autonomic 
arousal, as measured by differences in skin conductance level (risky minus safe)(SCL), and the 
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Figure 6. IA Hypothetically Moderating the Relationship between Autonomic Arousal and Slope of 
Learning. 
 
Figure 6. A conceptual diagram showing interoceptive awareness (IA) moderating the relationship 
between autonomic arousal, as measured by differences in skin conductance level (risky minus 
safe)(SCL), and slope of learning, the rate at which implicit learning takes place. 
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Figure 7. Average Risky and Safe Choices on the Iowa Gambling Task. 
 
Figure 7. The number of safe and risky choices for all participants were averaged per block. 
Differences between average risky and safe deck choices were greatest in the first block, with more 
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Figure 8. Smart Choosing by Block. 
 
Figure 8. Within each block a smart choosing score was calculated for each subject by subtracting the 
total number of risky deck choices from the total number of safe deck choices ((A + B) - (C + D)). 
Negative scores indicate a greater total number of risky choices, and positive scores indicate more 
safe choices. The average smart choosing scores of all participants for each block is plotted above. 
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Figure 9. Correlation between Interoceptive Awareness and overall Smart Choosing 
 
Figure 9. Contrary to what was expected, the correlation between interoceptive awareness (IA), as 
measured by scores of cardiac accuracy on the Mental Tracking Task, and smart choosing scores, 
safe minus risky choices, across the entire task showed that as IA scores went up the likelihood of 
overall smart choosing went down.  
 
 
